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Abstract
After an initial public oering, most existing shareholders are subject to a lock-up
period in which they cannot sell their shares for a prespecied time. At the end of the
lock-up, there is a permanent and large shift in the supply of shares. The lock-up expi-
ration is a particularly interesting event to study because it is (i) completely known and
observable, and (ii) potentially meaningful economically given the existing literature on
supply shocks. This paper investigates volume and price patterns around this period,
and documents several interesting results. Specically, even though the event is totally
anticipated, there is a 1% { 3% drop in the stock price, and a 40% increase in volume,
when the lock-up ends. Various explanations are considered and rejected, suggesting a
new anomalous fact against market eciency. However, convincing evidence is provided
which shows that this ineciency is not exploitable, i.e., arbitrage is not violated. This
aside, the evidence points to a downward sloping demand curve for shares, with the most
likely explanation pointing to a permanent, long-run eect.
1 Introduction
Are stock prices aected by either demand or supply shifts in the quantity of shares?
This question has been of paramount importance to nancial economists over the past
twenty-ve years due to its implications for whether markets are ecient or demand
curves downward slope. Numerous papers have looked at these implications in a variety
of dierent situations (see Scholes' (1972) block-trade study and Shleifer's (1986) S&P
index inclusion analysis for two particular examples). The evidence from this literature
is for the most part mixed. Specically, questions about the information content of the
event (e.g., block trade or inclusion in index, respectively), or the exact timing, nature
or length of the demand/supply shock tend to obscure the results.
This paper adds to the current literature by focusing on a particularly interesting
characteristic of all initial public oerings (IPOs). Typically, upon a rm going public,
the owners tend to sell roughly 15-20% of the company. As part of the IPO process,
the remaining 80-85% of the shareholders are almost always subject to a lock-up period,
usually (but not always) 180 days, in which they have agreed not to sell any of their
shares. Upon completion of this period, these shareholders are then free to sell their
existing shares. Thus, there is a completely observable event which results in a permanent
shift in the amount of available shares in the marketplace.
A careful analysis of the lock-up period's eect has several advantages over the pre-
vious literature. First, the event itself is completely expected with the lock-up period
length being spelled out in the IPO prospectus. Thus, we are able to form stronger con-
clusions about market eciency in this context. Second, in contrast to existing studies,
the event (i.e., the end of the lock-up period) is clearly not information-based. In fact,
almost all IPOs are subject to lock-up agreements. Third, because the end of the lock-up
period represents a permanent shift in the supply of shares in the market, this allows
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us a clean way of studying the eect of a known, long-run positive shift in one of the
quantities of interest.
Our results are somewhat surprising. At the end of the lock-up period, there is a
permanent drop in the stock price in the range of 1.15{3.29%, with a corresponding
38% increase in the volume of shares traded. This is anomalous evidence as it pertains
to market eciency in the sense that the markets are not rationally incorporating an
anticipated price decline. Because the lock-up period event is known with certainty, the
price drop should have been built into the price well before, in fact, during the rst
day of the IPO trading. We explore several plausible explanations, including (i) bid-ask
bounce, (ii) liquidity eects, and (iii) biased expectations of supply shocks, but nd they
have little support. Given that prices do not reect all available information, we ask
the question: why does the ineciency not get arbitraged away? Using data on bid-ask
quotes and short interest, coupled with investor's tax considerations, we argue that the
ineciency is dicult to exploit in practice. For example, the price fall is larger for stocks
that are harder to short and for stocks with bigger bid ask spread.
Nevertheless, given that there is in fact an anomalous price eect at the end of
the lock-up period, this is strong evidence in favor of demand curves for stocks being
downward sloping. With a positive shift in supply and a downward sloping demand
curve, the price would be expected to fall. We explore two popular economic hypotheses
of this result, namely price pressure (i.e., temporarily downward sloping demand curve)
versus long-run demand eects. We nd the evidence supportive of the latter theory, but
not perfectly, as some results are inconsistent with implications from long-run downward
sloping demand curves. On a dierent note, we provide some interesting evidence about
the predictability of the price drop. Perhaps, most interesting, the magnitude of the price
drop is related to the the stock's underlying volatility. We hypothesize that this variable
is a good proxy for existing shareholders' desire to diversify their asset risk.
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The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we describe the lock-up period for
IPOs, and the underlying economics related to the end of this period. This section
also describes the data used in this study, and the methodology and nance theories
associated with our analysis. Section 3 provides the main empirical results, with special
emphasis on trying to explain and understand the evidence against market eciency.
Section 4 analyzes what the price eects of the supply shock represent. Section 5 makes
some concluding remarks.
2 Preliminaries
2.1 The Lock-up Period
At an initial public oering (IPO), the existing shareholders rarely sell the entire company.
Instead, approximately 15-20% of the shares are issued to the public. Though not a legal
requirement, it is a standard arrangement for the underwriters to insist upon the shares
of the remaining 80-85% shareholders to be restricted from sale for a certain period of
time. This period, the so-called lock-up period, is one way of aligning the incentives of
the current owners and new owners, at least during the initial stages of the company
being public. There are no rules regarding the length of the lock-up period; however, the
majority of lock-up periods last 180 days, or approximately 6 months.
As an illustration of the lock-up language, consider the following excerpt from a typical
IPO prospectus: Holders of at least approximately 96% of all outstanding Common Stock,
as well as the Company, have agreed that, during a period of 180 days from the date of this
Prospectus, the Company and such holders will not, without the prior written consent of
the U.S. and International Representatives, directly or indirectly, sell, oer to sell, grant
any option for the sale of or otherwise dispose of any Common Stock or any security
convertible or exchangeable into or exercisable for Common Stock (except for Common
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Stock issued as part of the Oerings) or, in the case of any holder of Common Stock,
exercise any right to have securities of the Company registered by the Company under the
Securities Act.
The Prospectus, and in particular the lock-up agreement spelled out above, is a legally
enforceable contract. For existing shareholders to be able to sell their shares prior to
the lock-up expiration, they must receive permission from the underwriters. From time
to time, the underwriting group does grant permission and allow early sales of shares
by locked-up shareholders; however, the percentage of sales that are unlocked prior to
expiration is generally small. While the insiders of the rm, especially management
and active investors (such as the venture capitalists), are subject to additional vesting
agreements, most of the existing shareholders are free to sell the shares after the lock-up
period. These shareholders often have strong reason to do so. In general, these shares
represent signicant fractions of their wealth, subjecting them to signicant asset risk.
From a diversication point of view, it is natural that after the lock-up period there is
signicant selling pressure on these stocks.
From an economic viewpoint, this period is interesting for several reasons. First,
after the lock-up period, it is reasonable to expect certain characteristics of trading in
the stock. In particular, due to the shift in the supply of available shares, we would
expect trading volume to rise. This is because the quantity of liquidity trading (i.e., non
information-based) increases in proportion to the supply shift, which is often three to four
times the number of IPO issued shares. Second, and related, some of this new volume
will more likely reect seller-motivated trades as shareholders diversify their asset price
risk. While the exact quantity of selling is an empirical question, there is little doubt
it takes place. Third, there have been a number of papers documenting the eect of
demand/supply shifts of shares, and buyer/seller-motivated trading. In this paper, the
lock-up period is unique because, ex ante, it is not an information-based event. Though
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one might argue that excessive (or lack of) sales of insiders suggest bad (good) news
about the company's prospects, it is important to note that these excessive sales are not
known during the lock-up period. In addition, informed selling is somewhat mitigated
by additional vesting periods which are standard for insiders. Fourth, the event, i.e., the
end of the lock-up period, is known at the time of the IPO. In fact, it is spelled out in the
underwriting section of the prospectus. Thus, rationally, markets should incorporate the
economic impact (if any) of either price pressure or permanent shocks to share supply.
In other words, the price impact should be built into the IPO traded price long before
the end of the lock-up period.
2.2 Existing Literature
Analysis of the lock-up period allows us to study how stock prices and volume behave
when there is a signicant increase in the supply of shares a set number of days in
advance. This analysis is relevant for two distinct areas of the current nance literature,
namely (i) tests of market eciency, and (ii) the question of whether demand curves
slope downward.
With respect to whether demand curves slope downward, there are a plethora of
papers that look at this question. Perhaps, the best known literature studies block trades,
i.e., temporary shifts in supply, and nds ambiguous evidence. (See, for example, Scholes
(1972), Mikkelson and Partch (1985), Holthausen, Leftwich and Mayers (1991) and Keim
and Madhavan (1996).) The reason for the ambiguity relates to the diculty of separating
the information eect of seller-motivated trading from possible price pressure induced
by downward sloping demand for shares. In response to this work, but only partially
successful, are the papers on demand shifts for shares via an analysis of stocks that are
added to a commonly traded index. (See, for example, the dierent conclusions reached
by Shleifer (1986), Dhillon and Johnson (1991) and Lynch and Mendenhall (1997).) A
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related paper by Kaul, Mehrotra and Morck (1999), which studies weights adjustments
for stocks already included in an index, nds evidence supporting a downward sloping
demand curve. Their analysis is like ours in the sense that the event, i.e., weights
adjustment, is clearly not information-based.
1
Here, there is an unequivocal increase in the supply of shares available for trading
in the secondary market.
2
This supply shock is permanent to the extent that the lock-
up period no longer governs a signicant fraction of the shareholders' holdings. If the
demand curve is in fact downward sloping, then a permanent shift in supply lowers the
stock price. Whether this price decrease is permanent or not depends on one's view of
whether demand curves are temporarily or permanently downward sloping. The concept
of downward sloping demand curves are an anathema to many nancial economists,
but do not necessarily imply market ineciency. For example, divergences of opinion
about share prices can lead to demand schedules (e.g., Varian (1985)), as can the lack
of substitutability across assets (e.g., Scholes (1972)). In either case, the IPO market
maybe an especially appropriate event for analysis of downward sloping demand curves
for shares.
While downward sloping demand curves are not inconsistent with market eciency,
our paper does provide a clean, powerful test of whether prices rationally incorporate
public information. The event, i.e., the end of the lock-up period, is (i) completely
1
Hodrick (1992,1999) provides evidence that supply curves are upward sloping using a sample of
Dutch auction tender oers, which can be viewed as the mirror image of the demand curve cases. The
later paper is also relevant to the extent that it focuses on the interaction of corporate nancial decisions
and demand elasticity.
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There are a number of papers which look at permanent shifts in the supply of shares, such as
stock repurchases (Comment and Jarrell (1991)), seasoned equity oerings (Asquith and Mullins (1986),
Kalay and Shimrat (1987), and Barclay and Litzenberger (1988)), and the forced conversion of bonds
(e.g., Mikkelson (1981)), among others. The focus of these papers is for the most part the impact of
information on market prices; nevertheless, this literature provides an early motivation for the analysis
in this paper. Relative to these papers, two unique characteristics for the expiration of the lock-up
period are (i) the sheer size of the supply shift in the number of shares to be traded, and (ii) the event is
clearly not information-based. In fact, as mentioned previously, almost all rms are subject to lock-up
arrangements, so the inclusion of one in the prospectus is not even a surprise.
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known and observable, (ii) potentially meaningful economically given the literature on
supply shocks, and (iii) related to a complex vehicle, namely that of IPO pricing. Clearly,
because the end of the lock-up period is known in advance, and there is possibly signicant
price eects from the event, the price impact should be incorporated immediately into
price. In particular, the IPO price upon trading should adjust for the price impact
implied by the event discounted at the required return on the stock. While it is dicult
to test how much of the price impact is incorporated into the IPO price, on average,
there should be no meaningful price impact around the end of the lock-up period. Our
analysis falls into the category of papers that document calendar-day anomalous eects
(such as the January eect, Keim (1983)), or look at price responses on announcement
versus implementation dates (as in, for example, Lynch and Mendenhall (1997)).
2.3 Sample Description
Our study is based on a sample of all IPOs during the 1996-1998 period. The data on
IPOs collected from SDC, while stock return and volume data was gathered from CRSP.
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The sample consists of 1662 rms which went public on one of the three major U.S. stock
exchanges, i.e., the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE), the American Stock Exchange
(AMEX), and the NASDAQ market. Of these 1662 rms, 1056 had lock-up periods of
180 days, 327 had greater than, 88 less than, and 131 had no lock-up period at all. We
dropped all rms with either no lock-up period or long lock-up periods (i.e., greater than
365 days). In addition, all rms without the lock-up ending in 1998, or with stock prices
less than $4 (to avoid price discreteness), were also deleted from the sample. This left us
with 1053 rms in our sample.
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For each IPO, we calculate the following characteristics: (i) daily returns, (ii) daily
3
A random sample of IPO prospectuses were examined to check the SDC data on lock-ups.
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For out-of-sample purposes, the sample extends to include all rms that went public during the
1990-1995 period. This leads to an additional 1785 observations under the above characteristics.
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volume, (iii) closing ask, bid and transaction prices at the lock-up end, (iv) short interest
on the stock prior to the lock-up expiration, (v) the standard deviation of analyst's
earnings forecast, (vi) the stock's estimated volatility over the lock-up period, and (vii)
rm descriptive information (such as stock price level and size). Along with these data,
aggregate data on stock indices were also calculated, including the CRSP equal- and
value-weighted stock indices, as well as an IPO constructed index return. The IPO
constructed index return includes all IPOs of less than one year, represents an equal-
weighted index of each IPO, and thus hopefully matches better with the individual rms.
This created a portfolio of approximately 250-300 rms on any given day.
2.4 Methodology
Our estimates of abnormal returns on stocks are based on market-adjusted prediction
errors. In particular, we write
AR
it
= R
it
  R
It
; (1)
where AR
it
is the abnormal return on stock i on day t, R
it
is the return on stock i on
day t, and R
It
is the return on the index I on day t.
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For each of the 1053 rms in our
sample and 1785 rms in the extended sample, we calculate the cumulative abnormal
return (CAR), starting from 20 trading days prior to the end of the lock-up period to 20
days after. That is, we look at windows of one month in either direction. Cross-sectional
averages of CARs are then estimated and evaluated for their economic and statistical
signicance.
The lock-up expiration itself is analyzed in two ways. The rst way looks at just the
event date, which is dened as day 0 or day -1 in terms of the number of locked up days
5
The index chosen was either the CRSP equal-weighted index, CRSP value-weighted index, or an
IPO-adjusted index. The results were essentially the same for all three indices. The results reported in
the tables refer to the IPO-adjusted index.
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after the IPO.
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The second way includes the entire prior week, i.e., day 0 to day -4, as
a further investigation of how well markets incorporate the lock-up event. Of course,
as previously mentioned, because the lock-up expiration is completely anticipated, there
should be no real price eects on or before this date.
Excess volume is also calculated for each stock. In particular, from day -60 to day -21
relative to the end of the lock-up period, we estimate the average volumes of each stock.
For day -20 to +20, we calculate the ratio of daily volume to its mean.
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These volumes
are then averaged cross-sectionally to get an estimate of the excess volume across each
day surrounding the end of the lock-up period. That is, for each day, we estimate an
average excess volume. This statistic, and the CAR mentioned above, are the basis for
the empirical analysis of Sections 3 and 4.
3 Results
3.1 Summary Statistics
Table 1 provides summary statistics on the characteristics of the rms in our sample.
Though these companies did an IPO, and thus tend to be smaller and clearly younger
rms, their volume during the lock-up period is relatively high. For example, during the
pre-event period as dened in Section 2.4 above, the average volume was 73,729 shares
traded per day. Even accounting for the obvious skewness in volume, the 25th percentile,
median and 75th percentiles are 22,549, 41,725 and 77,381 shares, respectively. These
rms clearly trade.
Of particular interest to whether the lock-up eect is exploitable, Table 1 provides
6
Observationally, choosing the lock-up expiration is dicult because it depends on whether the
prospectus is viewed as being eective on the IPO date or the night before when the underwriter
purchases the shares. In our random test of the sample, every lock-up expiration came on either day 0
or day -1. Hence, for the analysis to follow, these days are combined.
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To reduce the impact of outliers, that is, extraordinarily high volume days, we truncate the ratio at
50 times normal average volume.
9
statistics for the bid-ask spread, as well as the short interest. Though these rms trade
frequently, the spreads are on average 3.3% of the rm's price. Even though the eective
cost of trading is much smaller than the spread itself, nevertheless, this transaction cost
is sizeable.
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With respect to the short interest held in the stock, it tends to be relatively
small as a fraction of the shares issued in the IPO, e.g., 3.1%. The standard deviation,
however, is 7.5%, which suggests that there exist some stocks with large short positions.
Generally, the arbitrage opportunity prior to the lock-up expiration rests on the ability
to short the stock. Whether this has an important economic impact on the stock price
is studied later in Section 3.
With respect to the lock-up period, Table 1 shows that the majority of shares out-
standing, i.e., 59%, get unlocked at the end of the period. However, due to additional
stock vesting agreements among managers and insiders, there is some variation in the
amount unlocked.
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Just as important a priori for understanding the lock-up eect are
two additional facts. First, these rms tended on average to have run-ups in their stock
price during this sample period. Second, the average volatility of these stocks is on the
order of 4% per day, which translates to an astounding 60% plus on an annualized basis.
If the rst fact suggests that these stocks are an important part of investor's portfolios
at the end of the lock-up period, the second fact surely points to strong diversication
motives.
3.2 Main Empirical Findings
Figure 1 graphs the mean excess volume across the sample, relative to the end of the
lock-up period. As expected, there is a large jump in volume on this date, with the mean
8
For a breakdown and explanation of the bid-ask spread versus eective spreads, see Madhavan,
Richardson and Roomans (1997), among others.
9
Information about the number of shares unlocked is available for roughly half the sample (i.e., 423
rms). Thus, the various statistics in the table should be interpreted in this context.
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being 61% larger than its pre-event average. While volume subsides over the following
few days, there is a permanent shift in volume of around 38%. (See Table 2B for the exact
numbers.) Of course, the increase in volume is not surprising given the lock-up period
releases a signicant number of shares to the secondary market. If liquidity trading is
at all a motivation for buying/selling on the part of investors, then we would expect a
permanent shift in volume. Moreover, the higher volume at the end of the lock-up period
is consistent with shareholders selling their positions for diversication reasons.
Given the evidence (albeit mixed) on downward sloping demand curves for shares,
the supply shift is clearly an important economic event. It is, however, completely
anticipated. Thus, from an expectational point of view, there should be no impact
on the stock prices of these rms. Figures 2A and 2B show that this is not the case. For
example, on the lock-up expiration (which we have dened as day 0/-1), there is a 1.15%
average drop in the price. Extending this period an additional three days surrounding
the end of the lock-up period (i.e., day -4 to 0), the drop increases to 2.03% for the price
of stocks that have gone through IPOs. In theory, if this result is driven by downward
sloping demand for stocks, we would expect it to be incorporated on the oering date
some 180 days earlier.
Several observations are in order. First, Figure 2B graphs the average CAR for these
stocks, and, while there is an overall drop of around 2.5% during the entire period, it is
permanent. That is, there is no bounce back even though there is signicantly heavier
volume on day 0 relative to the days following the lock-up end.
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Interestingly, the
permanent drop in stock price is consistent with a permanent increase in the volume of
shares traded. The coincident event is the end of the lock-up period.
Second, Table 2A documents the statistical signicance and impact of these results.
10
In case one month is not sucient to determine the end of the selling pressure to the lock-up day,
we also checked volume and CARs for an additional month. There was essentially no change in either
of these variables, giving further evidence of a permanent eect.
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With a sample of 1053 rms, and a relatively small standard deviation, it should not be
surprising that the t-statistics for the drops in stock prices are 5.81 and 6.61 using day
0/-1 and day 0/-4, respectively. There are two additional pointed empirical results which
emerge from the analysis. Note that approximatley 60% of the stocks see their stock
price fall at the end of the lock-up period. Not only is this percentage highly signicant,
but also suggestive that the result is not being driven by a few outliers. In addition,
there is suggestive evidence that this fall is highly predictable. Separating the stocks into
high and low volatility on an ex ante basis provides an additional 1% drop in the stock
price at the lock-up end.
Third, Table 2C provides an analysis of the correlation between the CAR (at the lock-
up end) and excess volume measures. In particular, the correlation between the CAR
and excess volume during this period is -0.17, which is highly signicant at the 1% level.
Thus, the results are strongly supportive of a negative relation between permanent price
changes and excess volume. This result is consistent with excess volume at the lock-up
expiration being highly correlated with the permanent shift in volume from the unlocking
of shares. In fact, this excess volume has 0.37 correlation with excess volume after the
lock-up end. However, somewhat puzzling, the correlation between the permanent price
drop and permanent excess volume is only mildly negative (i.e., -0.03). Alternatively,
suppose that there exists a number of informed traders who wish to sell on or after the
lock-up day. If this informed trading leads to greater excess volume, then one would
expect the price to fall as volume increases.
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Although it is dicult to entangle these
eects, the overall result is discussed in more detail in Section 4 with respect to downward
sloping demand curves.
In any event, the results in Table 2A have important implications for market e-
11
We thank the referee for pointing out this alternative explanation of the correlation between con-
temporaneous excess volume and price changes.
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ciency. Here is an event (i.e., the lock-up) which almost every IPO is subject to, which
is completely specied and anticipated, yet produces negative excess returns of roughly
2% over a short time interval. In theory, given the permanence of the stock price drop,
arbitrageurs, or even just existing shareholders, should have an incredible incentive to sell
the shares prior to the run down. Is there an alternative explanation of these ndings?
In the next two subsections, we explore two areas. First, are these results in any way
spurious? We look at three possibilities: (i) enhanced liquidity due to the higher volume,
(ii) bid-ask bounce eects due to more trades being seller motivated, and (iii) biased,
or ex post incorrect, expectations about the size of the supply shock. Second, given the
ineciency exists, why is it not arbitraged away in practice? We explore the eect of
the bid-ask spread, short interest on the stock and tax considerations on the ability of
investors to arbitrage the lock-up eect.
3.3 Plausible Explanations
3.3.1 A Liquidity Eect
There is growing evidence in the nance literature that investors require a liquidity
premium for assets. For example, Amihud and Mendelson (1986), Brennan and Subrah-
manyam (1996), and Brennan, Chordia and Subrahmanyam (1998), among others, all
nd evidence that the required rate of return increases with measures of illiquidity.
Here, there is a signicant increase in volume (and permanently so) around the lock-up
period. Putting aside the fact that these stocks trade frequently (see Table 1), previous
research suggests that liquidity should increase in this environment. If liquidity increases,
however, the stock price should rise, not fall. A cursory look at Figures 2A and 2B does
not bode well for any type of liquidity story. In fact, there is a clear downward movement
in the stock price around the lock-up expiration.
As an additional check, we regress the stock's two CAR measures on the daily dollar
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trading volume in the pre-event period. Thus, the volume variable is completely prede-
termined. In addition, this regression is performed in the context of a multiple regression,
thus, holding xed a number of related eects. (See Table 4.) Firms with low volume
prior to the lock-up expiration should enjoy greater liquidity (i.e., increased volume) as a
result of the lock-up end and thus suer a smaller price drop. However, evidence favors
a smaller price drop for higher dollar volume stocks, which is in contrast to the liquidity
story. For example, for a one standard deviation increase in dollar volume, there is a
corresponding 0.77% and 1.29% increase in the stock price at the lock-up end respectively
measured by day 0/-1 and day 0/-4.
3.3.2 Bid-Ask Bounce
There is a large literature on the eect of bid-ask bounce on the distributional patterns
of stock returns. For example, Lease, Masulis and Page (1991) argue that buy-sell order
imbalance, and thus bid-ask bias, around seasoned equity oerings partially explain the
negative price eects found in the literature. (See also Lakonishok and Smidt (1984),
Dopuch, Holthausen and Leftwich (1986), and Keim (1989) for similar examples.) The
bid-ask eect may be relevant here because we know that, at the end of the lock-up period,
there is an incentive for many existing stockholders to sell their shares for diversication
reasons. Thus, it is expected that, throughout this event, it is more likely a trade is seller-
than buyer-motivated. Of course, whether the last recorded price is a buy or sell, and
furthermore at the ask or bid, is an empirical question. Before addressing the empirics,
it is informative to consider the underlying microstructure eects and implications.
Suppose the asset's recorded price, V
M
, is equal to its true price V
T
plus an adjust-
ment due to the bid-ask spread,  (see, for example, Blume and Stambaugh (1980)). In
particular, let
V
m
t
= V
T
t
+ 
t
; (2)
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where 
t
equals
s
2
with probability
p
2
,
 s
2
with probability
p
2
, and 0 with probability 1 p.
Clearly, s represents the spread here, and above we have dened the ask, bid and midpoint
of the stock price, respectively. At the end of the lock-up period, as shareholders are more
likely to sell, suppose there is a shift  increase in the probability of being at the bid.
The probability decrease is assumed to be spread proportionately between the ask and
midpoint.
For this model, the expected price change will be the true price change (i.e., a constant
if prices follow a random walk) minus an adjustment due to the spread:
V
m
= K  
S
2  p
: (3)
The price drop is a function of (i) the increase in probability of being at the bid, , (ii) the
size of the spread, S, and (iii) the probability of a transaction occurring at the midpoint,
1   p. For example, given a stock price of $20 (which represents 320 sixteenths), and a
2% drop, the implication is a drop of 6-7 sixteenths. This means the spread would need
to equal
3(2 p)
8
, or, for p = :25 and  = :25, 21 sixteenths or approximately 6.56%. Of
course, this spread is articially too high for the types of liquid stocks that are found in
our sample, and exceed the 3.32% spread documented in Table 1.
From an empirical point of view, there is not much evidence supporting the bid-ask
bounce eect. First, on average, the stock price does not bounce back the days following
the lock-up event. If there was a systematic eect, the drop should be temporary as
all bid-ask eects should be diversied away across the portfolio of stocks. Figures 2A
and 2B show that the stock price eect is clearly permanent, which contradicts this
implication.
Second, Figure 3 presents a graph of what we call the Closing Price Ratio against
event time. Note that the closing price ratio is dened as:
V
m
  V
b
V
a
  V
b
;
15
where V
m
is the transaction price as described above, V
a
is the ask price, and V
b
is
the bid price. If transactions were equally divided between the ask and the bid (or
alternatively at the midpoint), then we would expect this ratio to equal 0.5. The gure
shows that the closing transactions tend to be close to the 0.5 level, or at least, far away
from a value of 0.0 which is what you would expect if the closing trades took place at the
bid price. In fact, in the context of the above model, Figure 3 allows us to estimate , the
shift in the probability of being at the bid. After some calculations, a value of .48 (which
is the closing price ratio at the lock-up expiration) is consistent with a 2.67% increase in
the probability of being at the bid. Thus, the bid-ask bias in our sample is small relative
to the price eect. In particular, using the example from equation (3), the spread would
need to be approximately 24.58% to explain the price drop, which is unreasonable.
3.3.3 Unanticipated Supply Shocks
If markets are ecient, and anticipated supply shocks to shares had price impact, we
would expect these to get incorporated during the rst day of IPO trading. What happens
if these supply shocks were underestimated by market participants?
In theory, if on average the supply shocks across the 1053 rms were greater than
anticipated, we could get an average drop in price on the lock-up day. Of course, in order
to address this question, one would need a theory of expected volume. Since this theory
is beyond the scope of our paper, one empirical way of addressing the issue is to break
the sample by years. If underestimated supply shocks are an important determinant of
price, one might expect variation from year to year in the price drop. In particular, the
probability that the market participants made the same systematic errors each year is
ceteris paribus less likely.
Table 2A and 2B reports the results for the CAR and excess volume year by year. Ta-
ble 2A shows that the price drop around the lock-up period (i.e., day 0/-1) is surprisingly
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stable, yielding statistically signicant drops of 1.31%, 1.03% and 1.16%, respectively over
the three samples. Since each sample contains approximately 300-350 rms, the chances
that these are sampling error are remote. As an additional check, Table 2B estimates
the average excess volume during the lock-up end for each year. The excess volumes are
large, and similar in magnitude for each year; moreover, if anything, there has been a
tendency for excess volume to drop across the sample. Could the market have continually
been surprised by the amount of shares traded after the lock-up period ended? Clearly,
the fact that the price drops have not fallen over the sample, and excess volume has
persisted on these days, suggests little learning has taken place.
As additional evidence, we also extend the sample to an earlier subperiod from 1990
to 1995 (see footnote 4). These results are given in Table 2A. While the magnitude of
the drop is somewhat smaller, both the day 0/-1 and day -4/0 CARs are statistically
signicant at the 1% level, with drops of -0.63% and -1.28% respectively. Moreover, the
probability that these CARs are positive across the IPO rms is signicantly less than
0.5, with numbers very similar to the 1996-1998 period. Though not shown here, the
regression results to be described in Section 4.1 are also consistent across time periods.
The lock-up eect, therefore, is a consistent phenomenon through time.
3.4 Why Is the Lock-Up Eect Not Arbitraged Away?
Section 3 so far has provided strong evidence that the lock-up eect is not spurious.
That is, given that the lock-up expiration is anticipated, the market is not rationally
incorporating all public information into stock prices. If the lock-up eect is so persistent
as shown in Section 3.1.3 above, why has it not been driven away by arbitrageurs and
the like?
While it is dicult to answer this question fully, it is possible to consider the lim-
itations of arbitrage in the lock-up context, and whether these limitations can explain
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the stock price response. There are two types of individuals/institutions who could take
account of the anticipated price response prior to the lock-up expiration: (I) those who
hold shares, then sell them say a week prior to the lock-up end, and then repurchase the
shares after the lock-up period, and (II) those who short the shares prior to the lock-up
period then close out their position afterwards. Outside of the market risks of holding
the stock short-term, in theory the status of both investors (I) and (II) ends up being
the same prior to and post the lock-up period.
First, consider investor I. This investor has purchased the stocks either at the IPO, or
afterwards; otherwise, they are locked-up. Under current tax law, their gains are subject
to short-term capital gains. By holding the stock an additional six months, their gains
will be subject to long-term capital gains. Hence, unless the 1%{2% drop around the
lock-up expiration is enough to compensate the investor for the higher tax liability, these
investors have little incentive to take advantage of the lock-up eect. Of course, this
analysis is dependent on the marginal investor's tax bracket.
Second, consider investor I or II's actual arbitrage strategy. At worst, the strategy
involves buying at the ask and selling at the bid price. Given the summary statistics in
Table 1, this would immediately eradicate any prot from the lock-up eect. In practice,
however, investors' eective cost of trading is much less than the bid-ask spread (see,
among others, Madhavan, Richardson and Roomans (1997) and Huang and Stoll (1997)).
This is for several reasons, including the fact that not all trades occur at the quotes and
that informed trading has permanent impact on price movements. Nevertheless, in all of
the microstructure studies, there is a relation between trading costs and quoted spreads.
Table 3 provides a regression of the two CAR measures against the bid-ask spread. The
coecient is signicantly negative and economically important. For example, for day
0/-1, a one standard deviation decrease (increase) in the spread leads to an increase
(decrease) in the stock price of 0.95%. This result has a clear interpretation. When
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spreads are high, it is dicult to arbitrage the lock-up eect and it remains in full force.
However, as spreads narrow, the lock-up eect diminishes. The obvious reason is that
arbitrage only takes place outside transactions costs bounds.
12
Third, although investor II's strategy is not subject to the same tax issue as investor
I, there is the additional requirement of shorting the stock. In practice, shorting stocks
can be a nontrivial exercise. One crude measure of this diculty is the amount of short
interest in the stock relative to the number of shares outstanding. In our case, the relevant
number of shares outstanding are those issued in the IPO, which are not subject to the
lock-up agreement. Intuitively, if short interest is relatively high, then both locating the
shares to short and the cost of shorting tend to be greater. Table 3 provides a regression
of our two CAR measures against the ratio of short interest to the number of IPO issued
shares. Consistent with the theory, the higher (lower) the short interest in the stock,
the greater (smaller) the price drop. In other words, if the stock is dicult to short and
therefore arbitrage, then the transactions costs bound is less tight and the lock-up eect
is greater. For example, a one standard deviation increase in short interest is associated
with a drop of 1.34% in the stock price at the lock-up expiration.
The results of this section cannot explain the existence of the lock-up eect. However,
these results provide strong evidence that the magnitude of the eect is directly related
to the investor's ability to conduct arbitrage. Therefore, a reasonable inference is that
the lock-up eect represents a stock price drop consistent with no arbitrage, though not
market eciency.
12
The result here is in contrast to that of Section 3.1.2, which shows that the bid-ask bounce cannot
explain the stock price drop. The bid-ask bounce analysis tested whether the eect is spurious; this
analysis tests the extent to which it is arbitrageable.
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4 On Downward Sloping Demand Curves for Shares
The results of Section 3 provide an anomalous nding of market ineciency. Conditional
on this nding, however, it is interesting to analyze the underlying economics of the result.
Specically, conditional on the price falling around the end of the lock-up period, what
are the possible reasons for this decline? Three explanations of similar phenomena have
been discussed in the literature, namely information eects, price pressure and long-run
downward sloping demand for shares. We take these possibilities in turn.
First, there are no information eects here per se. At the time of the IPO, almost all
shareholders enter into a lock-up agreement with the underwriters and new shareholders.
While there is potential information in who sells at the end of the period, from an ex
ante viewpoint, the event itself contains no information. The anticipated information is
that the supply of shares increase substantially in the secondary market after the lock-
up period. Outside of some story related to biased expectations about the supply (see
Section 3.1.3), information-based theories are not relevant.
With respect to price pressure, the evidence is not very supportive. While the price
drop and negative correlation between price and volume on the day of the lock-up end is
consistent with price pressure, it is also consistent with other explanations. For example,
the price-volume eects could be driven by informed trading. More problematic are the
several empirical facts which do not support this hypothesis. First, and foremost, the
price drop is permanent. Price pressure would predict a temporary drop induced by
selling pressure from shareholders around the lock-up day. In contrast, Figure 2B and
Table 2A show that there is no meaningful bounce back in the price within one month
of the lock-up period ending. Second, and related, even if price pressure takes place
for many months following the lock-up period, the largest pressure is on the actual day.
Figure 1 and Table 2B show that volume is 23% greater on that day, yet there is no
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measurable bounce back the very next day when volume somewhat subsides. Moreover,
as mentioned in footnote 10, there is no real change in these results even when we go
beyond one month after the lock-up end.
The evidence is more favorable to the hypothesis that demand curves for shares are
downward sloping in the long run. As Figures 1 and 2 demonstrate, the shift in supply
corresponds to a permanent drop in the stock price. If demand curves are downward
sloping in the long run, and supply permanently shifts out, this is the exact result one
would expect. However, this is not completely substantiated by Table 2C, which docu-
ments only a mild negative correlation between the CAR (i.e., the permanent drop) and
the long-run shift in volume.
Nevertheless, we posit the following: stocks that have just gone through IPOs are
arguably the most attractive rms in terms of the downward sloping demand curve
explanation. First, newly-public stocks expand asset payos in ways which are not easily
duplicated by existing assets. In other words, on average, stocks that have just gone
through IPOs do not have clear asset substitutes. If IPOs represent an important part
of the economy, yet cannot be duplicated by existing assets, investors will sacrice the
arbitrage price to access these assets. Second, heterogeneity across investors can lead to
downward sloping demand curves. In particular, if economic agents have dierences of
opinion about asset prices, then in equilibrium the asset price may not be a sucient
statistic for convergence of these opinions (e.g., Varian (1985) and Harris and Raviv
(1993)). Third, and related, if there is not unanimity about rm value maximization,
then this too can create downward sloping demand curves for shares (e.g., Grossman
and Stiglitz (1977)). One might argue successfully that closely-held, yet publicly traded,
rms, such as those that have just had IPOs are most likely to fall into this class.
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4.1 What Explains the Price Drop?
If the price drop is due to the simultaneous interaction of the downward sloping demand
curve for shares and the shift in supply, then it maybe interesting to empirically explain
the magnitude and variation of the price drop around the lock-up period.
4.1.1 Supply Shifts
Assuming that the shift in supply arises from existing shareholders desire to oat the
stock, the main motivation would seem to be diversication needs. In particular, existing
shareholders would like to sell some, if not most, of their existing shares under two likely
scenarios: (i) a large run-up in the stock price prior to the end of the lock-up period,
and (ii) large volatility of the underlying price. Under both scenarios, the investor faces
greater asset risk because his holdings reect signicant portfolio risk.
13
Another measure
is the number of actual new shares that can be traded, that is, the percentage of shares
that are actually unlocked. While the data is available for only a subsample of rms
with respect to the number of unlocked shares, it seems worthwhile investigating the
predictive content of this variable.
Table 4 provides regressions of the price change for each stock around the lock-up
period on these variables, as well as important descriptive variables for stocks (such as
volume, stock price level, and rm size). These descriptive variables are chosen to address
some of the issues raised (and already commented on) in Section 3.1 and to provide for
popular controls in the empirical analysis. In addition, two samples are estimated, i.e.,
the full sample and a subsample which includes the unlocked shares variable.
In general, the most important determinants, economically as well as statistically, are
the variables associated with diversication. As expected, high volatility stocks tend to
13
One could argue that a large run-up actually works in the opposite direction. With signicant
wealth, the marginal value of gaining or losing a dollar is reduced if the agent is risk averse. Of course,
this is an empirical question.
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have much larger price drops. In fact, for a one standard deviation increase in volatility,
one should expect an additional impact of -1.02% and 1.86% respectively on the 0/-1 and
-4 CARs. Stock prices are not only the most sensitive economically to this variable, but
also statistically (as measured by the t-statistics). The other diversication variable, the
prior stock price run-up, is also important but actually goes in the opposite direction.
For a one standard deviation increase in the run-up, the price actually increases 0.67%
or 1.24% at the lock-up end, depending on the CAR measure. There are two possible
interpretations of this result. First, the wealth eect described in footnote 13 subsumes
the diversication eect. In other words, once the volatility eect of diversication is
accounted for, the wealth eect dominates. Second, if there is a tendency for investors
to sell losers, then there might be more selling pressure at the end of a lock-up for stocks
that have performed poorly.
14
The nal variable, the amount of shares unlocked, is both economically and statis-
tically weak. For example, a one standard deviation increase in the number of shares
unlocked leads to a 0.28% increase in the CAR (albeit with little condence). Ex ante,
one would expect a decrease in the CAR with long-run downward sloping demand curves.
This is in contrast to other theories, especially liquidity-driven ones. However, the lack
of statistical signicance, coupled with this variable not being a perfect proxy for the
stock's oat, make these results dicult to interpret.
15
4.1.2 Demand Curve Indicators
The discussion in Section 4 above suggests that some rms may be more likely to face
downward sloping demand curves for their shares. It, therefore, might be interesting
14
Of course, while this is consistent with tax-loss selling around the turn of the year, O'Dean (1998)
generally nds the opposite result, namely investors have a tendency to hold onto losers.
15
The fact that one rm has more shares unlocked does not necessarily mean its volume will be greater.
The key feature is the characteristics of the existing shareholders, i.e., are they likely to sell? Table 4
shows that the volatility of the stock return seems to be an especially important component.
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to explore this idea empirically. In particular, we measure the following two \demand
curve variables": (I) the standard deviation of analysts earnings forecasts as a measure of
divergent opinions and thus downward sloping demand curves, and (II) the ratio of stock
volatilities after a market closure versus no closure as a similar measure (e.g., Harris and
Raviv (1993))
16
.
Table 5 reports regressions of our two CAR measures against these demand variables,
controlled for the supply eects and rm characteristics employed in the previous regres-
sion. The results generally support the hypothesis of downward sloping demand curves.
For example, consider the relation between the standard deviation of earnings forecasts
and the CAR at the lock-up end (day 0/-1). The result is economically and statistically
signicant. As an illustration, a one standard deviation increase in this measure leads
to a 0.54% drop in stock prices. In other words, a steeper demand curve is consistent
with a larger price drop, all the supply shifts held constant. The other variable based on
volume around market closures provides weaker evidence, albeit in the right direction.
In particular, for a corresponding increase in standard deviation, there is an additional
drop of 0.39%.
5 Conclusion
This paper has provided powerful evidence that stock prices fall around the end of their
IPO lock-up period. This result is especially puzzling given that almost all IPOs are
subject to lock-up agreements which are clearly spelled out in public documents, i.e.,
completely anticipated. Since the price drop does not appear to be the result of a spurious
eect, this paper provides clear evidence against markets rationally incorporating all
16
Harris and Raviv (1993) argue that this is a reasonable measure of divergent beliefs among investors.
That is, the volatility on mondays and after holidays compared to the volatility on other days of the
week should be greater the greater investor's beliefs vary, which results in downward sloping demand
curves for shares.
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public information. While the fact that the price gets bid up too much in the rst place
is clearly anomalous, we provide arguments and evidence that the lock-up eect is not
arbitrageable. In fact, trading costs, the diculty of shorting newly-public stocks, and
short-term capital gains faced by the original shareholders, all help explain this fact.
From an economic viewpoint, the stock price fall is somewhat consistent with a down-
ward sloping demand curve for shares. Moreover, certain variables, such as the stock price
volatility, have clear predictive power for the magnitude of this fall. It might be inter-
esting to analyze the price and volume eects of other permanent shifts in the supply of
shares. These include for example stock repurchases (e.g., Comment and Jarrell (1991)
and Hodrick (1992)), seasoned equity oerings (e.g., Asquith and Mullins (1986), Kalay
and Shimrat (1987), and Barclay and Litzenberger (1988)), the execution of stock op-
tions or forced conversion of bonds (e.g., Mikkelson (1981) and Carpenter and Remmers
(1999)) , and the introduction of traded options or the amount of short interest (e.g.,
Asquith and Meulbrouk (1999)). The results in this paper suggest it may be worth
reinvestigating cases with permanent shocks to supply. Alternatively, is there something
unique about IPOs that cause these price changes? We hope this idea is explored in
future research.
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Table 1
Sample description
The sample includes 1053 IPOs issued between 1996-1998 with a lockup period of less than
one year that ended before 12/31/1998. We exclude stocks with a price lower than $4 ve
days before the lockup end.
Mean Median Std Dev Q1 Q3
Sample description
Market value of equity day -5, thousands 296,160 134,966 901,983 74,367 289,308
Total return from oering price 0.2932 0.1125 1.1237 -0.1875 0.4919
Shares unlocked/Shares outstanding 0.5932 0.6302 0.1768 0.5296 0.7095
Standard deviation of stock return 0.0410 0.0401 0.0149 0.0510 0.0304
Bid Ask spread/Price 0.0332 0.0260 0.0256 0.0150 0.0440
Short intrerest/Shares outstanding 0.0074 0.0015 0.0191 0.0002 0.0063
Short intrerest/Shares issued in IPO 0.0309 0.0047 0.0746 0.0008 0.0216
Volume in days -60 to -20
Shares traded daily 73,729 41,725 123,646 22,549 77,381
Dollar traded daily 1,555,323 554,618 4,946,814 246,770 1,261,817
Daily shares volume/Shares outstanding 0.0057 0.0038 0.0073 0.0023 0.0066
Table 2
Excess return and excess volume around lockup end date.
The sample includes 1053 IPOs issued between 1996-1998 with a lockup period of less than
one year that ended before 12/31/1998. We exclude stocks with a price lower than $4 ve
days before the lockup end. Daily excess return is measured at stock return minus an IPO
index return. Excess volume is the ratio shares traded to the average number of shares
traded on days -60 to -20 relative to lockup end.
Panel A
Excess return around lockup end date.
Mean Median % positive
Full Sample, 1053 obs
Cumulative excess return days -1 to 0 -0.0115
a
-0.0080
a
0.42
a
Cumulative excess return days -4 to 0 -0.0203
a
-0.0176
a
0.38
a
Cumulative excess return days 1 to 3 0.0023 -0.0024 0.48
Sample with daily STD>0.04, 528 obs
Cumulative excess return days -1 to 0 -0.0183
a
-0.0197
a
0.36
a
Cumulative excess return days -4 to 0 -0.0329
a
-0.0365
a
0.34
a
Cumulative excess return days 1 to 3 0.0017 -0.0075 0.45
b
CAR from -1 to 0 by year
Lockup end 1996, 273 obs -0.0131
a
-0.0084
a
0.44
b
Lockup end 1997, 404 obs -0.0103
a
-0.0077
a
0.42
a
Lockup end 1998, 376 obs -0.0116
a
-0.0083
a
0.40
a
CAR from -4 to 0 by year
Lockup end 1996, 273 obs -0.0171
a
-0.0130
a
0.38
a
Lockup end 1997, 404 obs -0.0234
a
-0.0184
a
0.34
a
Lockup end 1998, 376 obs -0.0193
a
-0.0189
a
0.43
a
Out of sample period 1990-1995 (1785 obs)
Cumulative excess return days -1 to 0 -0.0063
a
-0.0082
a
0.44
a
Cumulative excess return days -4 to 0 -0.0128
a
-0.0147
a
0.41
a
Cumulative excess return days 1 to 3 -0.0042 -0.0006 0.46
a
Panel B
Excess volume around lockup end date.
Mean Std Dev
Full sample
Average excess volume days -20 to -2 1.151 1.170
Average excess volume days -1 and 0 1.614 2.737
Average excess volume days 1 to 20 1.382 1.331
Excess volume days -1 and 0, by year
Lockup end 1996 1.705 3.090
Lockup end 1997 1.659 2.840
Lockup end 1998 1.499 2.322
Panel C
Correlation of Excess volume and excess return
Dependent variable Average excess volume
Days -1 to 0 Days 1 to 20
Cumulative excess return days -1 to 0 -0.165
a
-0.032
(0.000) (0.290)
Average excess volume days -1 and 0 0.368
a
(0.000)
a,b,c denotes signicantly dierent from zero at the 1, 5, and 10 percent levels.
Table 3
Excess return and the ability to exploit the strategy
Linear regressions relating cumulative abnormal return during the end of the lockup period
with and rm characteristics measures 5 days before the lockup ends. The sample includes
1053 IPOs issued between 1996-1998 with a lockup period of less than one year that ended
before 12/31/1998. We exclude stocks with a price lower than $4 ve days before the lockup
end. Short interest is the number of shares held in short position prior to then end of the
lockup period.
Dependent variable Cumulative excess return
days -1 to 0 days -4 to 0
Intercept 0.408
a
0.774
(3.11) 3.86
Short intrerest/Shares issued in IPO 0.169
a
-0.270
a
(3.76) (3.93)
Bid ask spread -0.401
a
-0.765
a
(3.16) (3.96)
Observations 461 461
Adj -R squared 0.036 0.047
a,b,c denotes signicantly dierent from zero at the 1, 5, and 10 percent levels.
Table 4
Excess return and rm characteristics
Linear regressions relating cumulative abnormal return during the end of the lockup period
with and rm characteristics measures 5 days before the lockup ends. The sample includes
1053 IPOs issued between 1996-1998 with a lockup period of less than one year that ended
before 12/31/1998. We exclude stocks with a price lower than $4 ve days before the lockup
end.
Dependent variable Cumulative excess return
days -1 to 0 days -4 to 0
Intercept 0.023 -0.011 -0.006 -0.058
(0.70) (0.18) (0.13) (0.65)
Number of lockup days 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
(0.33) (0.91) (0.93) (0.88)
Total return from oering price 0.006
a
0.038
a
0.011
a
0.068
a
(2.95) (4.15) (3.55) (5.13)
Standard deviation of stock return -0.682
a
-0.660
a
-1.251
a
-1.694
a
(4.71) (2.61) (5.61) (4.68)
Log of daily dollar trade 0.006
b
0.011
b
0.010
b
0.019
a
(2.15) (2.19) (2.40) (2.71)
Stock price day -5 0.000 -0.002
b
-0.001
a
-0.005
a
(1.14) (2.50) (2.75) (4.43)
Log of equity value -0.006
c
-0.007 -0.005 -0.006
(1.92) (1.11) (1.05) (0.57)
Shares unlocked/Shares outstanding 0.016 0.008
(0.81) (0.28)
Observations 1051 421 1051 421
Adj -R squared 0.025 0.050 0.038 0.094
a,b,c denotes signicantly dierent from zero at the 1, 5, and 10 percent levels.
Table 5
Excess return and downward sloping demand curve
Linear regressions relating cumulative abnormal return during the end of the lockup period
with and rm characteristics measures 5 days before the lockup ends. The sample includes
1053 IPOs issued between 1996-1998 with a lockup period of less than one year that ended
before 12/31/1998. We exclude stocks with a price lower than $4 ve days before the lockup
end. STD of analyst earnings forecast is the average standard deviation of analyst forecast
for FY1 (annual earning) over the rst year after the IPO. After closure STD/No closure
STD is the natural log of the ratio of standard deviation of returns on day after market
closure to standard deviation of returns on other days.
Dependent variable Cumulative excess return
days -1 to 0 days -4 to 0
Intercept 0.043 0.023 0.010 -0.006
(1.07) (0.72) (0.16) (0.12)
Number of lockup days 0.000 0.000 0.000
b
0.000
(0.68) (0.27) (2.04) (0.91)
Total return from oering price 0.005
a
0.006
a
0.009
a
0.011
a
(2.62) (2.99) (2.85) (3.56)
Standard deviation of stock return -0.743
a
-0.693
a
-1.477
a
-1.259
a
(4.39) (4.79) (5.63) (5.63)
Log of daily dollar trade 0.008
a
0.006
b
0.015
a
0.010
b
(2.58) (2.14) (3.23) (2.39)
Stock price day -5 0.000 0.000 -0.002
a
-0.001
a
(1.37) (1.00) (2.88) (2.68)
Log of equity value -0.009
b
-0.006
c
-0.009 -0.005
(2.39) (1.95) (1.56) (1.07)
STD of analyst earnings forecast -0.341
b
-0.366
c
(2.44) (1.69)
After closure STD/No closure STD -0.014
c
-0.009
(1.93) (0.86)
Observations 913 1051 913 1051
Adj -R squared 0.034 0.027 0.050 0.038
a,b,c denotes signicantly dierent from zero at the 1, 5, and 10 percent levels.
Figure 1: Average volume relative to lockup
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Figure 2A: Daily excess return relative to lockup
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Figure 2B: Cumulative return relative to lockup
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Figure 3: Close price relative to bid ask spread
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